Cases and Case-Lawyers*
Richard A. Danner**

In the nineteenth century, the term “case-lawyer” was used as a label for lawyers who seemed to
care more about locating precedents applicable to their current cases than understanding the
principles behind the reported case law. Criticisms of case-lawyers appeared in English journals
in the late 1820s, then in the United States, usually from those who believed that every lawyer
needed to know and understand the unchanging principles of the common law in order to resolve
issues not found in the reported cases. After the Civil War, expressions of concern about caselawyers increased with the significant growth in the amount of published law after private
companies entered the legal publishing market. By the turn of the twentieth century, it was
generally acknowledged the number of cases had made it impossible for attorneys to not focus on
locating precedents. In the twentieth century most references to case-lawyers were historical,
even as the amount of published law facing lawyers continued to grow.

I. Introduction: “A Mere Case Lawyer Can Never be a Great One”1
“If I were judge and wore the wig,
Into merits I'd try to dig,
And reason and right would govern my course,
Instead of demanding a case on all fours;
For I'd decide the cause on principle just,
Instead of on precedent covered with dust,
And the case lawyer'd get it right in the neck,
If I were judge, and on the deck.”
G. P. Nevitt, If I Were a Judge, 27 LAW NOTES (Edward Thompson Co.) 20, 20 (1923)

The final stanza of G.P. Nevitt’s poem captures the essence of a debate familiar to American
and British lawyers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The term “case-lawyer” was
used through much of the nineteenth century to disparage lawyers who apparently cared more
about locating direct precedents to resolve their current cases than understanding the legal
principles behind the reported case law. Criticisms of case-lawyers appeared in English journals
in the late 1820s, then in American periodicals as barriers to entering legal practice in the United
States were lowered, the number of lawyers increased, and the issues they faced grew more
complex. The criticisms came mostly from those who believed that all lawyers needed to know
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and understand the unchanging principles of the common law in order to resolve issues not found
in the reported cases. By mid-century, regular criticisms of the “mere case-lawyer” could be found
in American legal periodicals. After the Civil War (1861-1865), expressions of concern about caselawyers increased with the significant growth in the amount of published law that followed the
entrance of private companies into the legal publishing market. Some suggested that the
introduction of the case method of instruction at Harvard Law School in the 1870s and elsewhere
later in the century also encouraged the development of case lawyers.
By the turn of the twentieth century, more writers acknowledged that the ever-growing body
of published case law had made it impossible for attorneys not to focus on locating precedents.
During the twentieth century references to case-lawyers became less common, even as the amount
of published law grew in print, and then in digital formats in the last quarter of the century. This
article examines legal periodicals and other sources to explore the connection between the growth
in the number of published cases and reporters, and the hostility toward case-lawyers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

II. The Nineteenth Century Growth in Published Decisions
A. England
In the early nineteenth century, English courts appointed “authorized” reporters, whose reports
of cases were supposed to be the only versions allowed to be cited in arguments.2 By at least 1832,
however, cases published in other reports could be cited if certified by a barrister as his account of
the case. These unauthorized collections often (but not always) appeared more quickly than the
authorized reports and were less expensive, but their publication created problems of duplication,
variations in text, inclusion of unnecessary material and greater expense for the bar. An 1849 report
by a committee of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law argued that a new evil
had arisen in the number of unauthorized versions of the reports being published. 3 As the report
put it: “Competition, ordinarily productive of so much good, in this instance adds to the evil.”4
One later commentator described the situation by the mid-1860s as “intolerable.”5
What were perhaps the first published criticisms of the case-lawyer appeared in several articles
in the English Law Magazine in 1828-1829. An article in the magazine’s first issue found that
“the mere case-lawyer will be liable to continual error from trusting to fancied and incorrect
2
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analogies. In short, no sound lawyer ever was or ever will be made by the mere study of particulars.
The only way to know accurately, is to make sure of the principle ….”6 A later article characterized
a recent appointee to high office as “a good case lawyer [who] troubles himself very little about
principles[,] is well acquainted with laws as they are, and neither knows nor cares about their
origin.”7 Another asked whether a lawyer who understood rules was “necessarily an abler
practitioner, considered even as a case lawyer, than one whose memory is unaided by principles,
and who, when an index has supplied him a precedent, can merely state the strict letter of the law.”8
An 1838 note in the Legal Observer reported on a recent lecture at the end of which the speaker
acknowledged that he had “been frequent in references to decided cases--not that I by any means
think that what is called ‘a case lawyer,’ is even practically the best.”9 A few years later, however,
the Observer commented in a memorial: “It is sometimes the fashion to sneer at what are called
case-lawyers; but this is only because very few men indeed have the qualifications necessary to
become such.”10
Early comments on case-lawyers appeared in articles focused on legal education. In 1845, a
short article in the Law Students’ Magazine noted young lawyers’ difficulties appreciating that
“the law of England is grounded on principles, the study whereof will make the sure and scientific,
if not the ‘case’ lawyer. . . . Too much reliance upon case law, is apt to make a superficial lawyer,
who becomes by habit, a mere index hunter.”11 Commenting on the state of English and Irish legal
education, Henry Joy wrote that the main objective should be to ground students in the knowledge
of principles; not to train “mere mechanical collector[s] of cases.”12 Joy found that found that
case-lawyers were increasingly common in England and Ireland because the courts overly
encouraged the citation of cases and because of “the amazing number of reports.” 13 The
multiplicity of reports made it impossible for lawyers to get back to first principles, “‘mak[ing] the
profession one of technicalities, to be acquired by the exercise of the power of memory rather than
a philosophy to be acquired by the developement [sic] of the reasoning powers.’”14
A lengthy period of agitation and study resulted in the 1865 establishment of a Council of Law
Reporting, with responsibility for appointing each court’s reporters and supervising publication of
the reports. 15 Publication of the newly authorized Law Reports began publication almost
6
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immediately, initially in eleven series, then in six after 1873 and in four since 1881.16 The new
system did not end publication of other reports. Looking back in 1884, W.T.S. Daniel wrote: “It
may be a matter of regret with many that the successful establishment of “The Law Reports” has
not had the effect of relieving the Profession from what is thought to be the incubus of so many
contemporaneous Reports.”17
B. United States
At the time of the American Revolution few published court reports were available to domestic
lawyers. Only half of the approximately 150 volumes of reports published in England had been
imported, and “no more than thirty were in familiar use on this side of the Atlantic.18 Roscoe Pound
later observed that the repositories of law available to domestic lawyers were limited largely to
Coke’s Second Institute and Blackstone’s Commentaries.19 One early commentator noted that “[a]t
the close of the revolutionary war, and for full ten years afterwards, a book of American reports
was scarcely to be met with in any one of the states.”20 Another noted that before 1800, “[t]he best
library of American reports that could be summoned by money or magic … might have been borne
[in] the circuits in a portfolio.”21
Early court reporters noted the difficulties posed by the lack of American reports.22 Not only
were domestic reports important to the daily work of the practicing bar, they were necessary to
promote uniform administration of justice and to distinguish American common law from that of
England.23 Twenty-five years after the start of the American Revolution most American
jurisdictions still depended largely on the available English law reports.24 Fred Hicks counted but
five volumes of American reports in 1801 and eighteen in 1810, and lists only sixteen “more
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important volumes” of American reports published between 1789 and 1803.25 As the states began
appointing official reporters, reports were published more frequently. Published reports facilitated
access to out-of-state decisions and gave the legal profession a shared literature, making possible
the idea of a national common law.26 New volumes were often reviewed and critiqued in journals
of general interest, then later in specialized legal periodicals.27 In an 1821 address, Joseph Story
found that “[t]he best of our reports scarcely shrink from a comparison with those of England in
the corresponding period; and even those of a more provincial cast exhibit researches of no mean
extent, and presage future excellence.”28
Although they praised the quality of the new reports, Story and other antebellum lawyers were
wary of the effects of the increasing numbers of published cases on lawyers’ ability to know the
law.29 Story estimated that by 1821 “[m]ore than one hundred and fifty volumes of reports are
already published” and warned not only of being “overwhelmed with their number and variety,”30
but being “buried alive, not in the catacombs but in the labyrinths of the law.”31 An 1824 review
of several recent volumes of reports counted 198 volumes of American reports, then asked:
“Whither is this rapid increase in reports to lead us, and what are to be the ends and consequences
of it? . . . [W]hat mind will be adequate to the task of storing up the infinite multiplicity of decided
cases?”32 In the first volume of Commentaries on American Law, James Kent bemoaned “the
number of books which beset and encumber the path of the student,” arguing that “[t]he evils
resulting from an indigestible heap of laws and authorities are great and manifest. They destroy
the certainty of the law, and promote litigation, delay, and subtility [sic].”33
Others emphasized the practical costs of dealing with so many published reports. The 1836
edition of Hoffman’s Legal Study complained: “The increase in this portion of our literature within
the last thirty years, has no parallel in the juridical history of any other country. More than four
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hundred and fifty volumes of American law reports now load our shelves!”34 An 1839 article in
the American Jurist & Law Magazine counted 536 volumes and estimated that 30 volumes were
added each year.35 In 1840, a commentator in The American Jurist feared that “there are many
young lawyers who find themselves in the dilemma of … [Erasmus], called upon to select between
law-books and clothes.”36 In 1844, David Dudley Field observed that those lawyers “who have the
best practice, are tasked almost beyond endurance. The multiplication of law-books, and, above
all, the multiplication of courts, have quadrupled their efforts.”37 By 1848, there were an estimated
800 volumes of reports.38

III. Precedent and Principle
The importance of knowing the principles of law was emphasized in both Great Britain and
the United States even though approaches to precedent in the two countries had already begun to
differ by the time of the American Revolution. In the nineteenth century, while Americans
continued to view precedents “as embodiments of reason and experience” and avoided “too rigid
a doctrine of stare decisis in particular cases, British common law grew more rigid.39 A report on
English law in 1853 commented: “Judicial precedents are . . . to use the language of Bentham,
Judge-made laws, and, when long acted upon, become of equal force with the express enactments
of the Legislature.”40 In the United States, lawyers of the founding generation recognized the
importance of stability and certainty, but also believed that “a declaratory understanding of the
common law [permitted] some form of reexamination of the merits of a prior decision.” 41 By
1876, Benjamin Abbott saw “less subordination” to precedent than earlier, but also found that “the
extent, variety, and complexity of the questions brought before the courts” had resulted in judges’
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“growing inclination to be advised by past decisions, as well as “more hesitation to decide a
question until what has been adjudicated upon it has been reviewed.”42
G. Edward White writes that early American lawyers viewed the common law “as a source of
timeless principles, consistent with natural justice, founded in reason, conforming to custom, and
influenced by divine revelation.”43 Joseph Story characterized American law as “a body of fixed
rules, themselves declarations of pre-existing rights or manifestations of universal principles,”
declared by the judiciary and embodied in judicial decisions.44 In 1835 Francis Hilliard wrote that
“in law, as in other sciences, there are certain broad and fixed principles, which …remain
unchanged amidst the fluctuations of successive ages.”45 In an 1851 lecture, Daniel Lord said
“[t]here are no new principles of jurisprudence to be discovered…its highest triumphs have been
in the application of old principles and not in the invention of new.”46 Story, Kent, John Marshall,
and their contemporaries believed that lawyers should be knowledgeable enough about the
foundational principles to apply them to new problems without relying on earlier decisions. The
importance of understanding those principles appeared both in expressions of concern about the
growing amount of published case law and in discussions of case-lawyers, who were seen as
willing to ignore broader propositions of law in the search for directly precedential cases.
The early nineteenth century emphasis on principles was part of a legal culture that Robert
Ferguson described as “a remarkable symbiosis between law and literary aspiration”47 which
impacted the training of lawyers and the early bar’s image of who the lawyer should aspire to be.48
In 1829, Story urged Harvard law students to “addict [themselves] to the study of philosophy, of
rhetoric, of history, and of human nature,” assuming they already were in “full possession of the
general literature of ancient and modern times.”49 The emphasis on breadth of knowledge was
42
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reinforced by legal commentators, treatise-writers and others who were developing the new
American legal system.50
As the connections between law and letters faded during the Jacksonian period, so did many
lawyers’ sense of the importance of the kind of education Story favored. Barriers to entry into legal
practice weakened,51 and the profession grew larger and more heterogeneous.52 The number of
reported decisions increased as well, and the established bar became more concerned about newer
lawyers who were less interested in understanding principles than in finding decisions they could
apply directly to problems at hand. Established practitioners and judges reminded students and
younger lawyers that to be successful, they needed to understand the principles of the law. Jesse
Bledsoe told an audience of Nashville law students that “[a] mere case lawyer, can never be a great
one.” If the facts of the reported cases differed only slightly from those of the case at hand and
did not “vary the principle, he is at a loss for the proper decision.”53 In 1851, a lengthy disquisition
on the nature and method of legal studies detailed the disappointments awaiting the lawyer who
“did not begin the study of his profession with a thorough inquiry into its principles.”54 In an 1854
lecture to Tulane law students, Christian Roselius acknowledged the value of the well-considered
judicial opinion but emphasized that some opinions disregarded basic principles, making the “mere
case lawyer … like a third rate player, who repeats the words of others, without troubling himself
whether he is uttering sense or nonsense.” 55 Alfred Conkling told the graduating class of law
students at the University of Albany that, if you ask a question of a case-lawyer, “if he happens to
remember a reported case exactly in point, he will tell you how [the case] has been decided,” but
not the principle applied. Without that case he would be unable to offer an opinion.56
In his study of nineteenth century legal thought, Perry Miller observed that by mid-century
lawyers of “the majestic era of John Marshall…were simply bewildered at [the] rising insistence
on practicality.”57 Miller was himself “struck with how plaintive became the laments of the
periodicals that the profession has been subverted by lawyers who regard the law as a mere
aggregation of arbitrary provisions.”58
50
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As legal practice became more complex in the last decades before the Civil War and the amount
of published law continued to increase, “[n]o lawyer could grasp the whole of the legal system
because the system simply became too big.”59 Consequently many lawyers felt obliged to master
particular areas of practice and partnerships started to emerge, prompting what Alfred Konefsky
called “a subtle move toward specialization… along the lines of specific areas of law…technical,
complex, and narrow.”60 As put by Ferguson, “[t]echnical competence triumphed over general
learning and philosophical discourse.”The shift to what he called “textbook law” changed the ways
that lawyers approached their work: “The early lawyer searched for a declaration derived from
common usage and consistent with nature. His successor, the reader of case reports, thought in
terms of the specific commands that society had place upon itself. … The first looked for
connections and resemblance; the second, for distinction and precision.”61 In an 1852 review of
the seventh edition of Kent’s Commentaries. Theophilus Parsons noted that “[a]lready, in many of
our law schools, provision is made for those who enter them, not to become lawyers, but to study
commercial law.”62 Perry Miller later took the comment to represent two opinions within the
American bar: “one held that its various departments were so extended that each scholar must
specialize, the other held to the position . . . that the law, like all true sciences, springs from a few
simple principles which can readily be acquired.”63
For lawyers faced with the growing complexity of the law in the reports, it became enough “to
find the detail and application of the law without worrying about comprehensiveness and
theoretical compatibilities.” 64 Bloomfield suggests that Jacksonian and Civil War era practitioners
“were even more likely than their predecessors to cherish a narrow vocational outlook toward their
work and to insist on a technical competence that set them apart from their fellow
men….”65Already in 1832, after noting French lawyers’ “loose and endless citation of decisions
upon every question,” 66 a review of a French legal treatise found that in the U.S. “a want of correct
ideas as to the real object and true value of reported decisions, has more than any thing [sic] else,
led to this unfortunate habit of encumbering [American] Reports with unnecessary and perplexing
references.”67 An 1840 discussion of legal practice in Maine remembered when: “A good voice,
a fluent utterance, and a discussion of general principles answered every demand, instead of the
heavy, ponderous arguments of the present time, larded all over with authorities from all quarters
of this and foreign lands, and often an endless variety of legal points and distinctions without
differences.”68
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Case-lawyers were criticized for lacking breadth and interest in matters beyond the
technicalities of law.69 In 1864, Richard F. Fuller opened an essay on “Literary Lawyers” by
reporting a notion “that the range of a successful lawyer's mind must be strictly limited to his
calling. To know law, nothing else, it is supposed, must be known. … We recognize this common
impression in the sneer of the case lawyer at literary accomplishments.”70 Fuller asked rhetorically
whether Scottish jurist Henry Brougham would have been as accomplished “had he neglected the
liberal influence of literature, had he kept in ignorance of public affairs, had he left his heart awaste
[sic], had he been, in short, a merely technical lawyer, or, worst of all, least of all, a mere case
lawyer?” 71 The case lawyer would neither read a book preface describing the state of the law at
an earlier time,72 nor peruse articles in a journal not confined to legal subjects.”73 In contrast to the
images of early nineteenth century lawyers presented by Ferguson, in mid-century the “mere case
lawyer” was seen as “a narrow-minded, short-sighted pettifogger,” whose “practice of reasoning
from cases instead of from principles… degrades the profession, and fills the law with absurdities
and injustice.”74 An 1870 memorial contrasted a lawyer with “a philosophic mind, enlarged by
extensive reading” with “the mere legal martinet—the case lawyer or empiric, who uses legal
precedent as the mason uses a brick or stone, the carpenter a stick of lumber….” 75 Looking back
on the period, however, Bloomfield asked whether late antebellum practitioners could be expected
“to waste time on frivolous cultural pursuits when it took constant effort just to keep abreast of the
increasing volume of new court decisions”?76

IV. Case Lawyers in the Later Nineteenth Century
A. The Legal Culture
In 1937, Wright characterized English law in the 1880s as “still the days of the case-lawyer,”
who used digests and precedent books to “find the cases you wanted by turning up the appropriate
heading (as you would find a train in the A B C).”77 At the time, E.S. Roscoe noted that, after
cases become too numerous, the case-lawyer was no longer “the good lawyer” of the past, “when
a knowledge of cases was synonymous with a knowledge of main legal principles with an apt
example of their application.”78 Charles Scott Dickson wrote: “We are every day becoming more
and more mere case lawyers, and the rapidity with which decisions accumulate nowadays will tend
to make us still more so. There are, indeed, now few cases in a session which are argued on
principle alone, apart from the authority of decisions.”79

69

See generally FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 66-72.
Richard F. Fuller, Literary Lawyers, 26 MONTHLY L. REP. 177, 177 (1864).
71
Id. at 186.
72
Book Review, 13 MONTHLY L. REP. 322, 322 (1850).
73
Jurisdiction of the Law, 10 AM. L.J. 424, 424 (1851) (“It is well known that this Journal is not confined strictly to
what the mere plodding case lawyer would denominate legal subjects.”
74
Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG. 491, 511 (1851).
75
Henry K. Smith, in L. B. (LUCIEN BROCK) PROCTOR, THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW-YORK 112, 112 (1870).
76
BLOOMFIELD, supra note 45, at 151
77
Wright, The Study of Law, 54 L. Q. REV. 185, 185 (1938) (address delivered to the University of London Law
Society, at University College, on October 24, 1937).
78
E. S. Roscoe, Position and Prospects of the Legal Profession, 1 L. Q. REV. 314, 323 (1885)
79
Charles Scott Dickson, Pleading, 9 JURID. REV. 14, 33 (1897).
70

10

Still, an 1892 review of two new books on the civil law suggested that “[t]he mere case lawyer
. . . is being superseded by lawyers who . . . have the advantage of some acquaintance with the
historic study of the development of law, and of being able, to some extent at least, to compare
their own system with that of other countries.”80 In 1899, an article in the Scottish Law Review
remarked that study of Roman law was “invaluable,- delivering the practitioner from the intangible
abstractions of the mere philosopher, and saving him, at the same time, from the misleading
analogies and confusions of the uneducated case-lawyer.”81
In the United States, the remnants of the legal culture nurtured by Kent, Story, and others
disappeared after the Civil War, but many writers continued to resist the idea that knowledge of
legal principles had become less important. In an 1876 review of the past century in American
jurisprudence, Benjamin Abbott wrote that, even though their applications had changed over time,
“the great fundamental principles underlying both the rules and the methods of the science were
recognized and obeyed then substantially as they are now.”82 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
generally positive review of Christopher Langdell’s first contracts casebook noted that “[t]he
popular prejudice that a case lawyer is apt to want breadth, has something in it….”83
By 1886, however, although Holmes continued to emphasize the importance of principles in a
speech to the Harvard Law Association, he also pointed out that Story’s “simple philosophizing
has ceased to satisfy men’s minds.”84 It was no longer enough for law teachers “to send forth
students with nothing but a rag-bag full of general principles—a throng of glittering generalities.”85
To make a principle worth anything, instructors must show how it would be applied in practice.
Ferguson writes that Holmes’s emphasis on specialization and expertise, along with his suggestion
that words conveying legal ideas should be “uncolored by anything outside the law” would not
have been understood by any early American lawyer.86
B. Educating Lawyers
Throughout the latter part of the century there was discussion of what author John Glover
termed the “much mooted question” of whether young lawyers should focus on principles or
precedents.87 In 1873, the Albany Law Journal argued that the law school’s “proper function” was
“to teach general jurisprudence - law as a science, not a science of precedents, but a broad and
liberal science of principles.” The law’s “application to the business of life” could be learned in
practice.88 Harvard professor Joel Parker emphasized the student’s need “to learn that that the law,
as a whole, is, necessarily, a mass of principles and rules.”89 Richard Harrington urged an audience
80
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of law graduates to read cases for the reasoning of the court, in order to “acquire the habit of
discussing cases from principles and cultivate a keenness of mental vision which will enable you
to distinguish between apparently conflicting authorities.”90 William Vilas criticized the
approaches of case lawyers, but pointedly told University of Wisconsin law students that the case
lawyer was “apt to be by no means a contemptible adversary. He may not be inventive in strategy,
but his ammunition will always be dry.”91
In 1870, Christopher C. Langdell introduced the case method of instruction at Harvard,
assigning his Contracts students a compilation of cases rather than a text-book.92 In the American
Law Review, Holmes questioned Langdell’s “seemingly exclusive belief in the study of cases,” at
the expense of “a rapid and continuous view of the principles deduced from them. And this can
only be got in the text-books.”93 Would emphasizing study of cases inevitably encourage the
development of case lawyers?
Because it was used initially only at Harvard, the implications of case method engendered little
discussion until other law schools began to consider its adoption in the late 1880s.94 John Chipman
Gray noted that the “mere verbal similarity” between the labels “case method” and “case lawyer”
made it possible to use the poor reputation of the case lawyer as if it were “a knock-down argument
against the method of study by cases,” but pointed out that the method had “no tendency to produce
lawyers of this type. …It uses the cases merely as material from which the student may learn to
extract the underlying principles.”95 Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1892, however,
Christopher Tiedeman argued that “the legal tyro is not mentally capable of extracting the
principles of the law from adjudicated cases.” Thus, most students exposed only to the case system
would “be impressed with the great weight of judicial precedent, and … become, what is so
generally deprecated, a case-lawyer, who thinks the whole business of advocacy consists of
persuading the court that the cases he cites in support of his side of the controversy, are to be
followed.”96 For others, such as Langdell’s disciple William Keener, who brought the case system
90
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from Harvard to Columbia, it was “an impossibility for a man to be academically learned in the
law as a science, and at the same time to be nothing but a case lawyer. The truth is that one of the
great arguments in favor of the case system is that it deals with both the scientific and the practical
side of law.”97
Despite the clarifications attempted by those who used the case method,98 concerns about its
connections to case-lawyering continued. An 1894 piece in The Law Student’s Helper discussed
whether students would do better to focus their reading on texts or on cases, concluding that: “The
text-book, rightly studied, will make him a lawyer; the case, studied as he will study it, can only
make him a practitioner.…”99 In an 1896 speech, the Helper’s editor expressed astonishment that
some law schools had “gone so far as to eliminate from their courses the study of Blackstone's
Commentaries,” resulting in “that pitiable modern product, the ‘case lawyer,’” who without a case
on all fours was “compelled to sit down with a ridiculous absence of the power to reason.” 100
William P. Black told the graduates of Union College of Law not to burden their minds with
precedents: “Rather let your general study be to acquaint yourself thoroughly with the principles
which have been established by, or recognized in the adjudged cases, and to familiarize yourself
with the proper methods of applying these principles to the determination of the cases in which
you are engaged…”101 In 1897, Isaac Phillips told the law graduates of Illinois Wesleyan
University: “A thorough knowledge of the principles of the common law is the abiding light by
which your daily professional walk must be guided.”102
In 1892, however, John Glover cautioned: “There are those who will say to the seeker after
light: ‘Depend upon principle, upon the reason of the thing. The law is pure reason. What is not
reason is not law. Do not be a case lawyer, one who is continually searching after a similar
case.’”103 Glover found such advice to be “misleading and dangerous,” pointing out that in many
cases more than one result was reasonable; if not, every judge would reach the same conclusion in
similar cases. Thus, “familiarity with the actual course of judicial decision is absolutely necessary
to the successful practice of the law.”104
Concerns that the case method produced case lawyers diminished in the twentieth century, but
did not disappear completely. In 1903, at the third meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Simeon Baldwin used his presidential address to criticize the case system, describing “its
main end [to] be to encourage and assist the student in the study and analysis of judicial
97
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precedents.”105 A 1904 article on “Law as an Academic Study” argued that the existence of case
lawyers and judges was due to hurried preparation for practice which left them ignorant of general
principles.106 As late as 1905, Judge Judson Harmon told new law students at the University of
Cincinnati that they would be taught to avoid becoming case-lawyers “because no case is ever
quite like another and to tell whether the differences distinguish them or not requires a knowledge
and application of principles.”107
A 1921 review of a new Contracts casebook noted that, for better or worse, in a time when
text books were “wellnigh [sic] relegated to a very subordinate place, . . . [t]he "case system" 'has
come to stay and . . . . a thorough understanding of it is a necessary part of a lawyer's equipment.”108
Yet in 1939, a new curriculum at Ohio State was announced with the comment that the changes
“should make a significant contribution to the developing of the student into something more than
a mere case lawyer who is helpless if not armed with a case in point.”109
C. Perceptions of Case Lawyers
Nineteenth century memorials, tributes, and other articles about particular attorneys or judges
often noted whether peers considered their subjects to be case-lawyers. An article comparing
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr observed that “probably Hamilton comprehended general
principles with more tenacity of grasp than did Burr; probably Burr was the superior case-lawyer
and his knowledge of precedents was more comprehensive and accurate.”110 John Marshall was
noted for rarely citing authorities, but “no reader of any decision ever suspected, or had reason to
suspect, ignorance or forgetfulness of any principles needed for the just determination of that
case.”111 The Albany Law Journal reported that “Chancellor Kent, when asked by a hopeful law
student what made him a great lawyer, laconically replied: ‘Lack of law books,’” then concluded:
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“Emphatically he was not a case lawyer.”112 Theron Strong remembered that Francis N. Bangs
“did not often refer to adjudged cases; he appealed to common sense and the ordinary principles
of justice” once remarking to Strong that “no man is fit to practice law that is not able to practice
it without law books.”113
It was thought that lawyers who understood principles and knew how to apply them were likely
to be remembered while case-lawyers were “often forgotten within the lapse of a generation.”114
If a case-lawyer were deemed worthy of being memorialized in the journals, he was rarely a “mere”
case lawyer, but a judge or lawyer who read cases not only to find precedent, but to improve his
knowledge of the law. Oscar Hord knew Indiana case law, but more importantly “[h]is mental
grasp was such that his knowledge of principles was as full as his mastery of details was perfect.”115
An obituary of the author and scholar Andrew Abbott noted that “[h]is enormous-field of reading,
embracing substantially all the decisions of the higher courts in this country and in England”
allowed him to cite authority on almost any question. Still, Abbott “was by no means a ‘case
lawyer,’ but considered every question on broad, legal grounds and general principles.” 116 New
York City’s Stephen Nash “was both an arguer from the principles of jurisprudence and a veritable
case lawyer; but never a case lawyer who could simply make citations without explanations and
fitting adaptation, as many lawyers crudely do.”117 The Chicago Legal News claimed that Judge
Van H. Higgins “was considered the greatest case lawyer that ever appeared at the Chicago Bar.
You could hardly name a legal question but what he could cite a case bearing upon it, giving from
memory the title of the case, the name of the volume and page where it could be found.” 118 Upon
his death, the newspaper reported that Judge Higgins “was noted for being able, in his opinions on
the bench and in his arguments at the bar, to cite all the opinions in the books upon any legal
question.119
Good case lawyers were “capable, first, of cracking the judicial nut itself, and, then, of using
its contents effectively.” A good case lawyer knew principles as well as cases, but “unlike the mere
theorist” was effective in court.120 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller urged young lawyers
not to let “fear of being called a case lawyer” cause them to undervalue reported cases. “No man
ever fully and thoroughly examined a difficult question of law, or mastered the intricacies of a
complicated cause, without becoming a better lawyer by the effort.”121
The case-lawyer was thought more likely to be found in cities than in the “country.” In 1870,
the Albany Law Journal found that many successful lawyers began their careers “in the rigid school
of country practice, where books were scarce [and] thrown upon their own resources, these lawyers
112
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framed their arguments upon their own ingenious reasoning, with but little assistance from textbooks or adjudicated cases.”122 Abraham Lincoln’s contemporary Leonard Swett came to
prominence in Illinois before “the degraded era of the case lawyer and the timid judge . . . [when]
[e]very man at the bar necessarily became a keen and ready reasoner, or fell off into obscurity.”123
Whether Lincoln himself should be considered a case-lawyer has been discussed from the late
1890s into the twenty-first century.124 The Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin noted that, because there
were fewer law libraries outside the cities, lawyers were forced to rely on reason and principles:
“There is less recourse to books and the argument of counsel as well as the opinion of the court is
not padded with lengthy and oftentimes irrelevant quotations. The so-called ‘case lawyer’ is an
anomaly in the country.”125 Solomon Boyer wrote that a country lawyer “faithfully attended to his
cow cases, his family settlements, his all-important mineral and water right cases, and many other
departments of the law of which the average city lawyer knows nothing…, and wins them, too, on
principles.”126 An appreciation published in 1906 noted that “[t]he country lawyer has few law
books, but he knows them well. … Of necessity, then, he is not a case-lawyer, but reasons from
principle rather than from precise authority.”127

V. Impacts of Late Nineteenth Century Reports and Finding Tools
A. Law Reports in England and the United States
By 1885 the Law Reports system had been in operation in England for twenty years. Nathaniel
Lindley acknowledged it was an improvement over the prior system of authorized reports, but
noted that the Bar still did not have “one set of reports which is alone to be regarded as containing
an authoritative exposition of the law as declared and applied.”128 Lindley cited the continued
publication of other series of reports as proof that the Law Reports “had not wholly succeeded in
removing the evil that called them into existence,”129 concluding that: “[a] multiplicity of law
reports is a great evil. The evil was once intolerable; it may become so again.”130
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In the United States, official reporters were common in state courts after 1850 and decisions
were published on a timelier basis than earlier. As the number of decisions issued continued to
grow, however, the official reporters lacked the resources to keep up.131 In 1867 a reviewer wrote
that “ [t]o possess a full library now of American law books, is to possess what has cost a
fortune.”132 Yet, American lawyers still argued for publication of all decisions, no matter how
many were issued, no matter the costs or the burdens added to their research. The Albany Law
Journal wrote that, the more cases reported, “the more likely are we to find the opinions and
judgments of wise and experienced judges upon cases similar to those we may have in hand. And
we all of us know how valuable is even one good precedent.”133 One result was what James
Campbell saw as an apparent need “for the display of erudition, which leads men who are
otherwise candid into garnishing their briefs and treatises with long lists of names taken on trust
at second hand, or gathered from the Digests, which represent cases that cannot possibly have been
carefully read, if read at all [and] bear witness to this by repeating misquotations and verbal errors
that sometimes have marred generations of predecessors.”134
When the number of decided cases increased at higher rates after the Civil War,135 commercial
publishers were positioned to offer quicker delivery of new opinions than the official reporters, as
well as easier access to opinions from other states. As Jessen put it: “[t]he private sector saw
commercial opportunity in the increasingly untimely publication of official reporters, and also in
parsing the growing number of opinions in various ways.”136 Some publishers offered selective
Ben-Yishai cites John Leubsdorf for the proposition that “[a] judicial opinion tells many stories and speaks with
many voices. It is less a single and anonymous utterance of the law than a condensed quarrel, less a line than a
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(2001).
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publication of cases thought to have particular precedential or illustrative value; others provided
comprehensive publication of appellate decisions, usually in packages of decisions from
neighboring states. By the 1870s much of the growth in published decisions was driven by
unofficial versions of the reports.137
In 1871 Bancroft-Whitney began American Reports, an unofficial series of selected state cases,
which included both “leading cases” and other cases “useful and important as illustrations of
established principles.”138 In 1879 the West Publishing Company took a different approach with
its NorthWestern Reporter, which contained decisions from appellate courts in Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and the Dakota Territory, and became the model for West’s
several series of comprehensive regional reporters, eventually known as the National Reporter
System. 139 As West expanded its coverage, it faced competition in the market for comprehensive
reporters in some regional markets. At one point, lawyers in twenty states were served by three
separate series of reports: the official and two commercial series.140 Despite calls for the
companies to resist competing in the same regions, in August 1885 West announced plans to cover
all remaining states.141 By 1888, all publishers with similar reporters had ceased their
publication.142
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In 1882 J.L. High predicted that the rate of increase in published volumes would continue to
accelerate143 and “lawyers now in practice at the bar may live to see the number of volumes of
reports in the English-speaking countries exceed twenty thousand.”144 High attributed the growth
to increased business before the courts and the number of new courts established to handle the
workload,145 but also blamed court reporters and publishers of official reports who issued as many
volumes as possible and tended to pad the volumes with material of questionable value.146
Selective reporters such as American Decisions and American Reports were “directed, not to the
prevention or curtailing of the multiplicity of reports, but merely to condensing the volumes of a
given series into a more compact form and into fewer volumes, still leaving the series itself to be
perpetuated and increased.”147 For High, these were inadequate solutions.
High wrote only a few years after the start of the NorthWestern Reporter and did not
discuss the impacts of West’s comprehensive approach on the growth of published reports. In
the Ages of American Law, however, Grant Gilmore blamed West for the flood of case law
and the problems it caused, arguing that the National Reporter System “may have dwarfed
the contributions of Langdell, Holmes, and all the learned professors on all the great law
faculties.”148 Lawrence Friedman has been less harsh, arguing that “lawyers’ own hunger for
precedent, for case law” drove the publication of more and more cases with the result that they
“simply gave up any attempt to grasp the whole of the law or stay abreast of it. They
concentrated on problems at hand, on the corners of law they dealt with day by day; and they
grumbled about the expense and the confusion of the law reports.”149 Willard Hurst pointed
out that a multi-jurisdictional common law legal system based on precedent “was inherently
costly to work with. It required time-taking search for authorities. It called for expensive law
libraries.”150
B. Finding Cases
Case lawyers were criticized for focusing on finding cases matching the facts of their
current cause. In 1898, the reviewer of a set of negligence cases described a trial in which one
lawyer read “a case on all fours with the case at bar,” only to have his opponent successfully
object that the case had no authority for the matter because it involved a cow, while the current
143
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case was about a hog. As the reviewer put it: “The moral of this is that, to the case lawyer and
the case judge it is not enough to satisfy the doctrine of stare decisis that two cases are ‘on all
fours with each other;’ they must both be ‘hog cases.’” 151
An 1888 review of a new digest of cases suggested that case lawyers and judges should be
called “fact lawyers” because of their obsession with finding cases having similar, preferably
identical, facts to their case of the moment. George Chase described the decision-making process
of a case-judge: “He collects a mass of cases, states the facts and decision in each, and then finding
them unfortunately in disagreement is in a state of unhappy bewilderment, … and lets his decision
fall, as likely as not, to the side where the cases are the greatest in number.”152
West Publishing Co. objectives were not limited to dominating the market for comprehensive
publication of judicial opinions. In 1889 John B. West stated: “it is the principle business of
American law publishers, to enable the legal profession to examine the American case law on any
given subject, as easily, exhaustively, and economically as possible.”153 In 1887 West began
publishing the annual American Digest154and in 1897, the 50 volume Century Edition of the
American Digest: “A Complete Digest of all Reported American Cases from the Earliest Times to
1896.”155 By the time the Century Edition was completed in 1904, West largely controlled the
market for digests in the same way that its reporters had taken over the market for publishing case
law in the 1880s.156
In 1898 the A.B.A. Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting referred to “an unnamed
publisher” as “[t]he agency…by which the demand for a multiplicity of decisions has been
increased, [and which] has in itself provided some remedy for the difficulties which have been
created.” As a result, “we [now] have uniform systems of reporting and digesting common to all,
and a basis, at least, of a common system which shall be satisfactory to all.”157 Although it was not
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named specifically, West viewed the Committee’s recognition as a formal endorsement of its
classification system as “the model of modern digesting.”158
Late nineteenth century lawyers also used legal treatises and encyclopedias to locate cases.
The earliest American treatises had documented the emerging common law and responded to the
earlier problems posed by the growing amount of case law, becoming perhaps the most significant
form of legal writing in the nineteenth century.159 In the latter part of the century, larger numbers
of treatises were published,160 but were no longer seen as sources for discussion of legal principles.
Like digests, they were now used as means to locate cases, and were often written by “a second or
third-rate lawyer, … employed to prepare a text-book on some legal subject, the fundamental and
governing principles of which he knows little or nothing about.”161 In 1888, Justice Samuel Miller
reminded University of Pennsylvania law students that “[m]ost of these modern treatises … are
but digests of the decisions of the courts, and though professing to be classified and arranged in
reference to certain principles discussed in the book, they are generally but ill-considered extracts
from the decisions of the courts.”162
Legal encyclopedias provided a measure of explanatory text along with summaries of
individual cases.163 The first to take on the specific problems facing late nineteenth century
American lawyers was Edward Thompson Company’s American and English Encyclopedia of
Law, which began publication in 1887, and was often cited in the law journals.164 The Cyclopedia
of Law and Procedure began publication in 1901165 and eventually reached 40 volumes before
being succeeded in 1914 by Corpus Juris.
Did access to an extensive law library and the tools to find “everything the courts have said”
encourage an attorney to become a case lawyer? Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley had a
large library (“probably the finest and largest private law library in the United States”), and was
158
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reputed to know “every book in it, as a shepherd knows his sheep.” But Bradley wasn’t “a mere
case lawyer; on the contrary he was inclined and loved to discuss points rather on principle than
by precedent.”166 N.C. Moak was “unquestionably the most accomplished case-lawyer in this
region, having reduced “the study and handling of cases … to an exact science.” His extensive
library, however, may have led him to be “too much addicted to case study and case learning.”167
The Albany Law Journal, however, suggested that it was “by no means a misfortune to a young
practitioner that he has not easy access to a large or a complete law library.” 168 An 1895 ABA
committee report suggested that “It is not at all clear but that it would be highly beneficial to the
profession, the bench and the client, if the fate of the Alexandrian library should befall very much
the larger portion of the reports of adjudicated cases in all English-speaking countries….”169
Contemporary digests and other finding tools drew mixed comments. An 1889 letter to the
Green Bag noted the need for better indexing of the facts of cases: a lawyer working on a dog case
“should at once be enabled . . . to find what he is after by looking under the heading of dog cases;
so with a cow case, horse case, etc.”170 Despite the shortcomings, Irving Browne argued that there
had not been another time “when it was so easy to find out what has been decided - not to say,
what the law is - as the present.” Thus, “if one is forced to be a case-lawyer, and that seems to be
inevitable now-a-days, there is no excuse for his not having ‘the last case’ at his fingers' ends, and
for not being intimately acquainted with all its ancestors and brethren.”171
English courts issued fewer decisions than American courts, but late nineteenth century
commentators were ready to criticize the indexing and digesting systems put in place for the Law
Reports. Nathaniel Lindley’s 1885 “History of the Law Reports” included detailed criticisms of
the Council of Law Reporting’s Law Reports Digest of Cases. Lindley found that its classification
system used too few (and often poorly chosen) titles, the titles were not sufficiently subdivided
into smaller divisions, and was “a Digest of cases, rather than of legal principles and rules with
references to the eases which illustrate them.”172As late as 1939, A.L. Goodhart wrote: “It is a
striking, although unfortunate, fact that it is less difficult to find the relevant American case among
the 40,000 annually reported cases in that country than it is with the 750 in England: this is due to
the centralized and efficient indexing system in the American reports.”173

VI. Principle and Precedent at the Turn of the Century
In the 1880s, some writers suggested that the continuing growth in published decisions might
eventually overwhelm case-lawyers and force them to focus on legal principles. James Campbell
observed that the multitude of reported cases had “led to excessive citations, and thus produced
confusion; but no court will listen to the indefinitely prolonged reading of authorities. However
indulgent the bench may be to such repetitions, there must be required at some time a statement of
166
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the principle claimed to result from the aggregate….”174 In 1884, John Dillon told the ABA that
as searching for precedents became increasingly onerous, the case-lawyer would be diminished
and cases would be argued and decided based on “knowledge of the great, living, fundamental
principles of our law and equity systems.”175 In 1888, an unsigned note in the American Law
Review held that the number of published cases hindered the case-law researcher more than it
helped: “there is scarcely a subject in this vast mass of case-made law upon which conflicting
authorities, if authorities they can be called, may not be found…. it is hard to tell whether the
successive efforts at rethinking the same question have been attended by any improvement of
result.176 In 1892, while emphasizing that “[t]he multiplication of reports and decisions is evil
altogether,” J.R. Lamar acknowledged the benefits of having new cases from all states “published,
digested, and within a week after they are delivered, scattered into the offices of half of the lawyers
of the Union ….” Among other things, access to the full multitude of cases would itself “so weaken
their authority that the mere case lawyer will be practically useless …. Precedent will neutralize
precedent. The bar will again be forced to the discussion of principles ….”177 In 1904, Edward B.
Whitney suggested that judges had become more resistant to citation of precedents: “[A]s the
wilderness of authorities presented upon the briefs of counsel tends every year to become more
hopeless, the courts in general tend more and more to decide each case according to their own
ideas of fairness, . . . and to pass the previous authorities by in silence . . . .” 178
In addition, by the 1890s, more articles commented on the importance of understanding
principles and precedents. J.W. McLoud pointed out that although “[t]he general principles of law
have probably nearly all been discovered and settled,” how they are applied changes with changes
in society. The case-lawyer should not be commended, but “the lawyer who studies the most cases,
will reach the most deserved eminence in his profession and success at the bar. There is more
wisdom in the many than in the few. Lawyers should get wisdom from all sources.”179 In 1892
Emlin McClain noted that the “practical lawyer” looks to find “discussion of the particular
principles applicable to his concrete case, [but] especially he wants to find the adjudications
involving facts similar to those of his case . . . .” 180 An 1895 ABA report on “the condition of law
reporting” stated that because principles are found in published reports, “the ‘case lawyer’ wins
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cases because he has examined the books thoroughly….”181 R. McP. Smith argued that “principles
are best learned by reading cases. The judge makes a fuller exposition of the principle than the
text-writer. The facts elucidate it. The style of the opinion is more familiar--more like that of a
good newspaper editorial--the best of style for such matter.”182 How could a lawyer advise his
clients “if he were obliged to rely on his understanding of general principles which he might deem
applicable to the complicated questions which are presented? How could the courts dispose of
business if every case were to be argued and decided without regard to precedents?”183 A brief
article in the Weekly Law Bulletin noted that “the growth and development of the law can be
learned only from the decisions of the courts.” The problem was not that case-lawyers relied more
on precedents than principles, but that many lawyers were not well-trained in analysis and
comparison of cases.184
In 1898, a letter to the editor of the Weekly Law Bulletin pondered whether there were as many
case-lawyers as “the noise made about them presumes to exist.” Although the expression suggests
that case-lawyers are ignorant of legal principles, it was hard to see “how any man, without a wellgrounded knowledge of legal principles, can be even a good case-lawyer. The ability to properly
sift the enormous mass and select the right cases as precedents to gain the point he seeks to
establish, presupposes a knowledge of the law.”185 But were there now too many cases for even
the skilled case-lawyer to sort through? J.D. Shewalter told the Missouri Bar: “When we reflect
that there is scarcely a mooted question upon which decisions cannot be found upon both sides ….
the case lawyer of the future can hope for nothing but a confused and unfathomable sea of
perplexity.”186
Still, as the nineteenth century neared its close, Judge U. M. Rose told the Virginia Bar:
[N]ow we are all either case lawyers, or are not lawyers at all. … Our legal arguments are
for the most part a mere casino-like matching and unmatching of cases, involving little or
no intellectual effort. The law is ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a
mere question of patterns.187
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Criticisms of the case-lawyer continued in the early twentieth century. In his 1903 presidential
address to the Association of American Law Schools, Simeon Baldwin argued: “The term ‘caselawyer’ is justly one of reproach.”188 John Dos Passos wrote that because searching for principles
had become subordinated to seeking precedents, the modern lawyer “carries, as a soldier would a
knapsack, a memory filled with sections of codes and adjudicated cases…. [his] nose is always to
be found in a digest, ‘case’-law accumulating so fast that he must have indices to search for his
precedents.”189 Theron Strong observed that “the effect of the large number of adjudged cases
contained in the reports has virtually transformed the profession from a class of lawyers able to
practice without law books to a class almost entirely dependent on the adjudged cases.”190
Yet, a Law Notes article claimed that the researcher’s real problem was not the bulky body of
case law, but the “clumsy and inferior tools” available for finding cases.191 A 1901 article in the
Yale Law Journal acknowledged that the many digests, encyclopedias, and other case-finding tools
were often poorly-compiled, but saw that they had “placed the youngest and oldest members of
the profession on a level in the examination of authorities.”192 As a result, “the most nimble
searcher among the digests triumphs over an opponent who relies on logical deduction from
principle,” while “the persistent continuance in practice of elderly men is viewed with illconcealed impatience by the pushing members of a profession in which activity is more in demand
than counsel.”193 Alfred Beveridge suggested that it was impossible to become a great lawyer
without being well-read in Blackstone and other classic legal texts, as well as in the sciences,
literature, and history, but he admonished young lawyers not to “go into a court without having
thoroughly reviewed and mastered all the precedents bearing on every phase of your proposition.”
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aside older knowledge as new knowledge was created. As a result, their knowledge base had only
increased, leaving the modern lawyer “doomed to begin at, practically, the same point from which
his predecessors of a hundred years ago took their start, and … [to] sift out for himself from the
ever-increasing pile of chaff the grains of wheat for which he seeks.”196 With the continual addition
of new cases, “knowledge of the law in its entirety has long been an utter impossibility, and every
lawyer has become, of necessity, a ‘case lawyer,’ … forced to rely upon the text writers and
digesters to guide him to the authorities.”197 The legal literature had fallen “further and further
behind, until the necessity for radical improvements in the methods of law writing has become
decidedly apparent, even to antiquated believers in general principles who deem a ‘case lawyer’
beneath contempt.”198
Iowa judge A.N. Hobson noted the “contemptuous manner” in which some lawyers claimed
the ability to resolve questions by applying principles without reference to cases.199 Hobson
pointed out that because the principles applicable to non-statutory questions were themselves
based in adjudicated cases, “no counsel can reasonably aspire to lasting success who does not study
and understand the cases.”200 An article in the West Docket feared that, if other lawyers continued
to sneer at the case lawyer, “knowledge of … objective authorities will have become a thing of the
past, while subjective impressions from uninformed and feeble reasoners will be rampant, and our
jurisprudence will be turned into a riot of loose thinking.”201
Other early twentieth century commentators acknowledged that practitioners frequently had
no choice but to thoroughly research the body of case law to lessen the chances that opposing
counsel would unearth unfamiliar precedents they could not counter. At the second meeting of the
American Association of Law Libraries, Frank B. Gilbert described the work of the modern caselawyer: “he knows his facts and seeks to apply thereto the law . . . . In this immense maze of
reported judicial determinations he may well think there is a case with facts like his which, if
found, will be conclusive upon the tribunal which he seeks to convince.”202
The West Publishing Company stood ready to facilitate a lawyer’s search for precedent, even
as some critics complained that the law “has been seized upon and converted into an industrial
scheme of gigantic proportions … for the manufacture of reports of decided cases of ponderous
digests and of so-called treatises compiled by day laborers from the digests.”203 In the early 1900s,
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West began taking an active role in training law students and practitioners to use its products. 204
Company representatives visited law schools to lecture on topics of legal bibliography205; in
addition, the company started two journals,206 and published a legal research and writing
textbook.207 In 1907 West representative Roger W. Cooley made the company philosophy clear in
an American Law School Review article stating that “knowledge of the law is to a great degree a
knowledge of precedents . . . to find cases showing how the principles have been applied . . . . [The
lawyer] must use the facts as a guide, because the application arises out of the act, and not vice
versa.208 Two years later, Cooley told an audience of law librarians that when a lawyer comes to
the law library, he should already have worked out the principle to be applied to his problem:
“[W]hat he wants now is cases applying that principle to facts on all fours with, or similar to the
facts in his case.”209 The second edition of West’s textbook: Brief Making and the Use of Law
Books, edited by Cooley, suggested that starting from a principle of law rather than the facts
required: “First, that the lawyer knows exactly what principle governs his case; and, second, that
he has such a thorough knowledge of the theory of classification on which his digest is based that
he can turn to the particular topic where that principle is illustrated.”210 The descriptive word
approach, which West was developing at the time,211 did not require the lawyer “to know the theory
or rules of classification” and ignores “all considerations of the science and theory of digesting.”212
In 1912 West introduced a comprehensive “Descriptive Word Index” consisting of “words and
terms descriptive of the persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and
remedies which have been the subject of litigation.”213 R. A. Daly, one of West’s law school
instructors, wrote that the aim of legal research “if possible, is to find that case, or those cases,
where, upon facts similar to the immediate question involved, some court has applied the law.”214
In 1915 Daly suggested that the principles of law are “well known to the profession” from law
school; but to apply principles in practice, “the court demands precedents; that is to say, the court
asks for cases decided in the past in which the facts were essentially the same.”215 Precedents are

204

See generally Frederick C. Hicks, The Teaching of Legal Bibliography, 11 LAW LIBR. J 2-4 (1918).
Id. at 3-4.
206
The American Law School Review (1902-1947) was billed as an “intercollegiate law journal.” West Publishing
Company’s Docket (1909-1944) aimed at a broader professional audience.
207
NATHAN ABBOTT, ED., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS (1906). The book was regularly reprinted
and issued in revised editions though the 1930s.
208
Roger W. Cooley, The Purpose of a Digest, 2 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. (West) 77, 77 (1907).
209
Roger W. Cooley, Use of Law Books, 2 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 2 (1909).
205

210

Roger W. Cooley, How to Find the Law, in ROGER W. COOLEY, ED., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW
BOOKS 156, 159 (2d ed. 1909).
211
Hicks (1918), supra note 206, at 3.
212
Id.
213
Advertisement: Editorial by the Advertising Manager, 1 WEST PUB. CO. DOCKET, Sept. 1912 [n.p.].
Fred Hicks referred to descriptive word indexes as “indexes to the master index” and suggested that: “Lawyers
of the old school used to scoff at such books, calling them ‘Yellow Dog books,’ suggesting that only the ignorant
need them.” Frederick C. Hicks, Technique of Legal Research for the Practicing Lawyer, 31 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 9
(1938). James Kerr suggests that the first indexes of this type were the “common sense indexes” devised by
Callaghan & Company. See James M. Kerr, Fixing the Law and Finding the Law, 15 LAW. & BANKER & S. BENCH
& B. REV. 275, 285 (1922).
214
R.A. Daly, The Descriptive Word, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 79, 79 (1912)
215
R.A. Daly, Analysis of Facts: Salient Elements, 3 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. (West) 593, 593 (1915).

27

found by analyzing the facts of the case at hand and using the descriptive word index.216 In 1920
he wrote that “finding the law in active practice means the locating of that adjudicated case where
some court, somewhere, at some time, applied the principle to facts on all fours with or closely
paralleling the facts of the case at bar.217 West’s publications were designed for lawyers needing
to find that case.
The situation of the case lawyer may have been captured best by Solicitor General John W.
Davis in a 1916 talk before the Judicial Section of the A.B.A.218 Davis quoted a recent opinion
that described the current bar as “an industrious, painstaking, far-reaching army of sleuths of the
type Sherlock Holmes, hunting some precedent in some case, confidently assured that if the search
be long enough and far enough some apparently parallel case may be found to justify even the
most absurd and ridiculous contention.”219
Davis justified the need to examine all published cases because of the courts’ reliance on
precedent: “To make precedents the fount and origin of the law is to compel their study … to put
a premium on this knowledge is to encourage its overexhibition by the overzealous.”220 As a result,
“the case lawyer… is not wholly a self-made man…. [h]e is rather the product of an environment
and of circumstances which he is powerless of his own motion to change or greatly modify.”221
Speaking to an audience of judges, Davis suggested that the judiciary write fewer full opinions,
write shorter opinions, cite fewer cases in their opinions, and publish them more selectively.222
Does not the case for the case lawyer come to this: that so long as the law is based upon
precedents, so long as judges multiply them, and so long as printing presses issue them,
just so long will the case lawyer spend his time in their collection, and just so long will
he belabor the courts with the fagots he has thus industriously bound?223
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V. Conclusion: Are We All Case-Lawyers Now?
American law and the legal environment changed dramatically in the nineteenth century,224
then, as Lawrence Friedman put it, went “from a walk, to a run, to travel on a supersonic jet”225 in
the twentieth. Among the changes was what Friedman called the “law explosion,” which
encompassed both the growth in the “sheer size and scale of the legal system,” and the quantity of
“sheer legal stuff.”226 In 1916 John Davis had argued that case lawyering was perhaps inevitable
in a system that put a premium on the knowledge in published cases, but he also saw that
“overexhibition [of this knowledge] by the overzealous” was exacerbated by the ever-growing
number of cases. 227 In the early part of the century, American Bar Association committees
continued to study the problems created by the growth in law books, sometimes in collaboration
with other organizations, but ultimately without much result.228 The 1923 report calling for
establishment of the American Law Institute cited “the great volume of recorded decisions” as a
significant cause of the two chief defects of American law: “its uncertainty and its complexity.”229
Advocates for restatements of the law suggested that the weight of the reported cases might break
down the legal system.230 In lectures published as The Growth of the Law, Benjamin Cardozo
called “the multiplication of decisions” the greatest cause of uncertainty in the law, suggesting that
“[t]he fecundity of our case law would make Malthus stand aghast.”231
Yet, complaints about the difficulties of locating precedent became less frequent, even as the
body of published law continued to grow. As early as 1917, librarian Mary Foote observed that
the bar’s criticisms were “now directed almost entirely to the problems of time and expense;
difficulty in finding the law is scarcely mentioned.” For Foote: “the increased facilities for the
examination of legal authorities have almost kept pace with their multiplication.”232 By the mid1920s, American lawyers had nearly forty years’ experience with West’s American Digest and its
classification system. The Century Edition of the digest covered cases through 1896; pamphlets
and annual digests indexed and organized newly decided cases; and a third decennial compilation
was in progress. Descriptive word indexes designed to facilitate fact-based research were widely
available. Other publishers based the classifications in their books on the West system.233
224
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With the start of the Great Depression in 1929, law librarians and others became more vocal
regarding the budget and space problems posed by the multiplicity and duplication of law books,
and much less was said about problems finding the law in the reports.234 Although occasionally
harsh criticisms of case-lawyers appeared through the middle of the twentieth century, they were
few235 and mostly historical.236
In 1977 Myron Jacobstein found that, although the “literature on court reporting is abundant
with dire predictions related to the flood of opinions,” the number of recent articles on the topic
had declined dramatically.237 Jacobstein attributed the lessened concern to newer specialized
research tools which reduced the impacts of the overall growth in published case law for lawyers
working in areas with significant legislative and administrative components.238 After the 1930s,
topical loose-leaf services became important research tools for many practice areas, bringing
together up-to-date versions of statutes, regulations and other material, as well as reporting new
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case law.239 In the last quarter of the century, as lawyers began to rely on legal research databases
like Lexis and Westlaw, and then the Internet, to locate case law and other legal information,
digests and other print-based tools became less important.240 A number of writers analyzed the
impacts of the changes on the practice of legal research, and the potential loss of structure that the
digests had provided.241 In the early twenty-first century, American lawyers continue to face
growth (and duplication) in published court opinions and other sources of law, but concerns about
the amount of law have taken second place to efforts to make all of it widely accessible. Initiatives
to promote free or low-cost access to digital sources of legal information for lawyers and the public
began to appear to appear in the 1990s and have continued.242
In the late 1800s publishers who favored more selective publication of cases sometimes
disparaged West Publishing Company’s effort to publish all appellate cases as the “blanket”
system of publication.243 John B. West embraced the term, seeing his company as providing a
blanket insurance policy to protect lawyers from losing cases because they did not find all
decisions on point.244 Access to published case law in the twentieth century contrasted sharply
with the nineteenth century, when a lawyer’s recourse was limited “to the digest of the reports in
the state in which he ‘hung out his shingle,’ -- if there was a digest,” or “to the United States Digest
. . . incomplete as it was in extent, and inconvenient as it was in use.”245 The West reporters and
digests gave lawyers confidence that could find what they needed, and helped quiet concerns about
case lawyers. In the twentieth century, we were all case-lawyers, as Judge Rose had predicted in
1896. In the twenty-first, lawyers and others needing legal information look less frequently to
digests than to networked digital sources to find the cases and other law they need. Some research
suggests that electronic research tools encourage lawyers to search for “directive language from
higher courts” to apply to their current cases, lessening their need to study full opinions.246 Could
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this be seen as a new form of case-lawyering? It appears safe to say that, regardless of changes in
publishing formats and the tools available to locate precedents, and perhaps also in how they use
the precedents they find, American lawyers remain case-lawyers now as they have been since
increasing numbers of cases became accessible to them in the second half of the nineteenth century.

language of opinions is increasingly being viewed as authoritative text, not all that different from statutes.” Peter
Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1187, 1247 (2007).
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